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Regionalism, Identity, and Hydropower 
Dams: The Chinese-Built Lower Sesan 2 
Dam in Cambodia
Oliver HENSENGERTH 
Abstract: The Greater Mekong Subregion (GMS) has been styled as 
a natural region drawn together by the Mekong River. However, the 
literature on regional identity has argued that regions are socially con-
structed phenomena. River basins in particular are historically evolv-
ed constructs of specific political and social relations. Drawing on 
concepts of regional identity and on the literature examining the links 
between culture and water, the article argues that the actors driving 
the GMS have exacerbated social tensions through hydropower pro-
grammes, thus failing to establish social coherence. These program-
mes focus on energy production for national economic growth and 
economic integration between GMS countries, but they ignore the 
need to govern water resources for the benefit of local communities, 
many of which are made up of ethnic minorities with specific cultural 
attachments to the river. This produces tensions around the type of 
development that takes place in the GMS, leading to value fragmenta-
tion rather than value convergence. The article explores these issues 
by focusing on the Chinese-built Lower Sesan 2 Dam in Cambodia.  
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Introduction 
The Greater Mekong Subregion (GMS) is experiencing a hydropower 
boom, driven by national governments, banks, and regional construc-
tion companies from Thailand, China, and Vietnam. Supported by 
the Asian Development Bank (ADB), the aim is to end electricity 
shortages and create sustainable power supplies through regional 
power trade, of which hydropower is a key energy source.  
Hydropower schemes, however, are prone to conflicts between 
users as well as between sectors. Divergent usage between rural and 
urban populations and competition between water, environment, 
energy, and agriculture sectors creates multidimensional conflicts 
across different geographical scales. Management of water resources 
for energy production to feed national electrification targets often 
fails to take into account the impact of a given dam on local fisheries, 
agriculture, ecological cycles, and local belief systems.   
Within the GMS, these conflicts are particularly violent in Myan-
mar and Cambodia and a strong civil society network has emerged 
across the Mekong region. These networks include NGOs and local 
communities who have resisted resettlement. A decade and a half 
ago, protests against large hydropower dams along the Chinese parts 
of the Mekong (Lancang) and the Salween (Nu) rivers were also 
widespread, epitomised by the high-profile campaign against the Nu 
dam cascade in 2003/2004 (Mertha 2008). While in China protests 
against hydropower have since died down in the face of concerted 
government efforts at repression, protests against large dams in 
Southeast Asia are increasing.   
These acrimonious conflicts around major development projects 
can affect how we perceive of the GMS as a region or, as it is official-
ly called, a subregion. Theorists of regionalism have argued that a 
region consists not only of transboundary infrastructure and govern-
ance organisations, but also that regionalisation entails a convergence 
of values. Hettne (1999a) has called this the creation of “regionness.” 
Regionness can therefore be interpreted as a shared sense of belong-
ing and popular identification with a region.  
Drawing on concepts of regional identity and on the literature 
examining the links between culture and water, the article argues that 
the GMS is exacerbating social tensions through its hydropower pro-
grammes. These programmes focus on energy production for nation-
al economic growth and economic integration, but they ignore the 
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need to govern water resources for the benefit of local communities. 
This produces tensions around the type of development that takes 
place in the GMS, leading to value fragmentation rather than value 
convergence.  
The article examines these propositions through an analysis of 
interactions of actors involved in the conflict around the Lower Sesan 
2 Dam in Cambodia, which is a part of the GMS power grid. Con-
struction on the dam, built by China’s Hydrolancang, was begun in 
2014; it was subsequently commissioned (opened) in September 
2017. The Chinese government has enthusiastically embraced the 
GMS and has committed substantial funds to building infrastructure, 
including but not limited to energy-production systems and railroads. 
Amongst the latest initiatives is the Lancang–Mekong Cooperation, in 
whose framework China is collaborating on water resources, some-
thing the country had previously rejected. Chinese companies have 
built most of the large hydropower dams in Cambodia, they have 
substantial stakes in the hydropower sector in Myanmar, and they are 
increasing their influence in Laos. Most crucially, perhaps, Chinese 
companies are due to build a substantial part of the planned main-
stream Mekong dams, including both proposed mainstream dams in 
Cambodia.   
The article will first discuss the connections between regionalism 
and identity and then address the links between water and culture. It 
will then outline the official discourse of the ADB-sponsored GMS 
project and the role of China in building hydropower infrastructure 
before analysing the Lower Sesan 2 Dam and the implications for the 
GMS as a region. Data comes in the form of interviews conducted 
over several years. An initial round of interviews was conducted in 
September 2010 with officials from several Cambodian ministries 
(Environment; Industry, Mines, and Energy [now the Ministry of 
Mines and Energy]; and Agriculture, Forestry, and Fisheries); with 
representatives from the Cambodian Investment Board; and, further, 
with independent consultants, NGOs, and foreign embassy officials. 
Interviewees were chosen based on their knowledge and involvement 
with: rationales for the government’s hydropower plans; the decision-
making process for international hydropower financing; policies and 
practices of hydropower-induced resettlement; and the environmental 
impact assessment (EIA) process with specific reference to the Lower 
Sesan 2 Dam.  
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These interviews were updated in April 2012 based on e-mail 
conversations with an independent consultant working on hydro-
power politics and land rights in Cambodia for NGOs and interna-
tional organisations. A round of face-to-face interviews was conduct-
ed in July 2015 with representatives from Cambodian NGOs in-
volved in the Lower Sesan 2 project. A final interview was conducted 
in June 2017 via Skype with a member of a Cambodian NGO in-
volved in community resettlement in the Lower Sesan 2 project.  
Regionalism and Identity 
There is wide agreement in the literature that regionalism is a reaction 
to global developments (Fawcett and Hurrell 1996; Gamble and 
Payne 1996; Fawcett 2004). However, the question of what consti-
tutes a region remains hotly contested. Approaches vary considerably 
between territorial, cultural, economic, and political explanations (see, 
e.g., the overview in Mansfield and Milner 1999: 590–592 and in 
Fawcett 2004).  
Constructivists argue that regions are socially constructed and 
that, therefore, there are no natural regions (Katzenstein 1997; Hettne 
and Söderbaum 2000; Jessop 2003). This brings into focus not only 
geographical boundaries but also the social nature of regions. Accord-
ing to Söderbaum (2012), constructivists explore how regions come 
into existence. From this viewpoint, regions are not naturally given 
but are “dynamic settings for social interaction” (Söderbaum 2012: 
18). Similarly, Hettne (1999a) argues that regions “are created and 
recreated in the process of global transformation” (Hettne 1999a: xv). 
Viewing a region as socially constructed emphasises the norms and 
values, shared practices, and beliefs that hold a region together. Re-
gions are therefore intersubjective creations that embody a link be-
tween identity and space; these creations are not fixed, but continu-
ously produced and reproduced (Emerson 2014).  
The production of regional identities is a contest over contend-
ing images and meanings of the region. Regional identity can be de-
fined as “regional attachment, belonging or collective consciousness” 
(Zimmerbauer 2011: 246). Zimmerbauer (2011: 244, 255) argues that 
although regional identities are seen as a precondition for a successful 
image-building project, newly created regions are often established by 
supranational actors who then begin to create a regional image 
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through place promotion, which may be more relevant to external 
actors than to the inhabitants of the region. The new region may thus 
be unfamiliar and even meaningless to its inhabitants. 
The problem of unfamiliarity is aggravated where regional images 
are created around the use of a particular resource, such as water, as 
in the case of the GMS. In such cases, regions can be located at basin 
scale with the basin becoming a unit for economic planning. Swynge-
douw (2009, 2014) argued that river basins are historically produced 
waterscapes, characterised by specific political, social, and natural 
relationships. These human-made waterscapes are contested, as their 
conceptualisations change depending on how, where, and by whom 
water is used. They are therefore a reflection of dominant power 
relationships (Molle, Foran, and Floch 2009). The consequence is the 
production of overlapping hydro-social scales, structured by compet-
ing networks of interest (Swyngedouw 2007).  
The case of newly created regions is of relevance to the GMS, 
which was created through an initiative of the ADB in 1992 in order 
to promote trade and investment between member states – China 
(provinces of Yunnan and Guangxi), Myanmar, Laos, Thailand, 
Cambodia, and Vietnam – and to attract external investment. The 
ADB views the GMS as a “natural economic area” bound together by 
the Mekong River (ADB 2012b: 3). The GMS was therefore purpose-
fully located at basin scale. Yet, rather than being a natural unit, the 
creation of institutions to govern this area, and the financial and 
technical incentives provided by the ADB to facilitate trade and in-
vestment, clearly indicate that the GMS is a created region. The invo-
cation of the river as the tie that binds the region together is particu-
larly problematic, as it frames the Mekong as a source of energy and 
transport that benefits primarily macroeconomic development while 
it simultaneously ignores the rights of riverside communities engaged 
in subsistence fisheries and agriculture, as the case of the Lower 
Sesan 2 Dam will show.   
The social cohesion of this region is therefore in question and so 
is the extent to which a conflict between region-promoting agents 
and inhabitants creates conflict or cohesion. To investigate this prob-
lem and its impact on the creation of regional identity, the article now 
explores the relationship between water, culture, and identity.   
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Contending Visions of Place and the Links  
between Water and Culture 
Political ecologists have pointed out that nature is produced in par-
ticular ways as power influences human–environmental interactions 
(Castree 1995; Bryant 1997). The alignment of different stakeholders 
and their ability to shape nature to their requirements therefore de-
termines which development narratives prevail and which are ig-
nored. As Johnston and Donahue (1998) argued, the politics of water 
represents a struggle over the right to land and water resources, and 
therefore over the control of place. This struggle often involves a 
complex relationship between water, culture, and power.  
In her conceptualisation of waterscapes, Strang (2004, 2009) 
pointed to the material and non-material aspects of such waterscapes. 
Material aspects can include larger infrastructure (such as dykes or 
dams) or smaller infrastructure (such as fish weirs). Non-material 
aspects can be of aesthetic or spiritual nature and include, for in-
stance, sacred sites. Whatever their form, “waterscapes are concerned 
with the ongoing materialisation and perpetuation of particular cul-
tural lifeways” (Strang 2004 cited in Johnston et al. 2012: xvi).  
Indeed, Greaves (1998) and Whiteley and Masayesva (1998) 
pointed to a permanent connection between water and the cultural 
survival of indigenous populations where traditional economic, social, 
and ritual activities depend on rivers. Ettenger (1998) reported how 
dwindling and polluted rivers may affect indigenous communities in 
terms of not only their physical well-being but also their mental well-
being. In this context, Mazumdar and Mazumdar’s (1993) argument 
that a strong link exists between religious rituals, identity, and place 
becomes relevant. In these conflicts between different lifeworlds and 
identities, Whiteley and Masayesva (1998) observed a conflict be-
tween the interests of indigenous communities, corporations, and 
governments, creating tensions between multiple stakeholders across 
different scales.  
Observing state-led development of water resources in the Andes 
region, Boelens argues that the organisation of water resources devel-
opment signifies a process in which  
dominant groups have supplanted the diversity of water cultures 
and rights to make everyday water management and social rela-
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tions graspable and controllable, by installing dominant water 
players’ rights categories and frameworks. (Boelens 2015: 9) 
The issue is therefore not simply access to water, but recognition of 
cultural rights and the ways in which these rights are protected as 
pressure on water resources continues to grow. 
The same river can thus have different – often competing – 
meanings for different population groups that pursue different cul-
tural lifeways. According to Greider and Garkovich,  
every river is more than just one river […]. Cultural groups trans-
form the natural environment into landscapes through the use of 
different symbols that bestow different meanings on the same 
physical objects or conditions. (Greider and Garkovich 1994: 2) 
Exploring the links between identity and place in the Niobrara Na-
tional Scenic River in Nebraska, Davenport and Anderson (2005) 
discovered a “web of river meanings” as different people and groups 
develop different forms of attachment to the river that can also 
change over time.  
For hydropower, meanings of water and spiritual and emotional 
well-being conjoin where dam-induced resettlement threatens com-
munities, particularly those deriving social, economic, and spiritual 
benefits from the river. Problems are not necessarily clear-cut, how-
ever. While Vorkinn and Riese (2001) found that strong positive 
identification with a place can produce negative attitudes towards 
proposed hydropower projects, others have suggested that communi-
ties might be positively positioned towards a transformative project, 
also based on their attachment to the place (Twigger-Ross, Bonaiuto, 
and Breakwell 2003).   
Indeed, a dam might be viewed as negative or as beneficial by 
different members of the community, or by different communities in 
the affected area. Whether or not communities benefit depends on a 
number of factors, including their position in the river basin, which 
determines the types of benefits or costs they receive from the dam, 
or the specific livelihoods pursued (Siciliano et al. 2015). At the same 
time, it also depends on religious and other cultural practices in rela-
tion to the surrounding environment, as well as on communities’ 
perception of their identity and of the prevailing power relationships 
with dam proponents. 
Processes of identity, culture, and power therefore produce dif-
ferent waterscapes. The article now explores this phenomenon for 
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the Mekong Basin, using community resistance to the Lower Sesan 2 
project as a case study.   
Hydropower, Identity, and Geographies of
Water Use in the GMS 
In Mekong hydropower schemes, interventions come in the form of 
multilateral development banks, national and local governments, and 
infrastructure companies. Resistance comes from local communities 
refusing to be resettled and calling on governments and investors to 
allow them to participate in the decision-making process in order to 
arrive at solutions that balance the interests of disparate user groups.  
A key problem here is the way in which water is used for hydro-
power generation. Hydropower has been criticised for exacerbating 
rural–urban and local–national divides by emphasising urban and 
national priorities to the detriment of rural and local needs. Gilron 
argues that  
the location of population relative to water and energy sources 
suggests that there is a need to choose those technologies for en-
ergy and water production, which produce an appropriate match 
between sources and population. (Gilron 2014: 1471) 
In order to achieve such a match within multiple water-use systems, 
Penning de Vris (2007) called for the establishment of learning alli-
ances of water users to create a balance between multiple uses and 
multiple users of water. He points to a need for integration across 
three dimensions: spatial, temporal, and social – that is, to make deci-
sions about the geographical scope, the time frame, and the needs of 
different water users (Penning de Vris 2007: 80). Similarly, Robinson 
et al. (2015) show that values of indigenous communities can be in-
corporated into basin governance in a way that achieves both locally 
important outcomes and basin-scale outcomes. Values of indigenous 
communities thus do not prevent the realisation of needs beyond the 
local scale.   
By locating the GMS at basin scale, and thus by projecting an 
image of the GMS as a natural region, the ADB and national gov-
ernments reflect a specific scalar version of a waterscape that ignores 
other views. The Mekong Basin therefore sees the competition of 
different “basin narratives” that construct very different Mekong 
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identities, which are tied to specific scales of water use (Sneddon and 
Fox 2015). These narratives are at the same time narratives of identi-
ty, place, and belonging. Conflicts over water use therefore become 
conflicts over identities. 
The GMS is premised on the belief that deploying cross-border 
infrastructure and enabling cross-border trade, investment, and tour-
ism will help Mekong states to integrate economically (ADB 2011). 
While the Chinese provinces of Yunnan and Guangxi are GMS 
members, the central government is not but has identified the GMS 
as a strategic economic area and has pledged considerable sums to 
enable cross-border economic activity to develop the region into a 
vibrant market for products from Western China and as an invest-
ment destination for Chinese companies (Hensengerth 2010). Turn-
ing the region into a key economic area, however, goes beyond GMS 
policies and includes, perhaps most crucially, the construction of the 
Kunming–Singapore Railway, also known as the Pan-Asia Railway 
Network, which has now become part of the Chinese government’s 
“One Belt, One Road” strategy (see, for example, Wu 2016).   
Chinese companies, amongst the key players in building up the 
hydropower capacity of the region as a whole, are constructing the 
majority of Cambodian hydroelectric stations, have substantial stakes 
in the hydropower sector in Myanmar, and are increasing their influ-
ence in Laos. They are, in particular, some of the key actors building 
the 11 proposed mainstream dams on the Lower Mekong, including 
Sambor and Stung Treng, the two proposed dams on the Cambodian 
stretch of the Mekong (Hensengerth 2015). China has further begun 
to explore regional infrastructure connectivity and the joint exploita-
tion of water resources through the Lancang–Mekong Cooperation, 
which is a Thai–Chinese initiative introduced at the 2014 China–
ASEAN Summit and inaugurated in 2015 and which runs alongside 
the GMS.  
A key policy in energy development is the creation of a regional 
power market with hydropower as a cornerstone (ADB 2012a). Ac-
cording to the ADB power trade plan, new hydropower stations will 
facilitate energy security, reduce price volatility, and enhance export 
earnings where hydropower is earmarked for export rather than for 
domestic consumption (ADB 2009). (On energy development in the 
GMS, see also Yu 2003; Watcharejyothin and Shrestha 2009.)  
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The ADB’s 2010 update of the GMS Regional Master Plan sees 
China (provinces of Yunnan and Guangxi), Thailand, and Vietnam as 
the main importers, their combined power demand projected to con-
stitute 96 per cent of the power demand in the GMS in 2025, when 
power demand is expected to peak. Cambodia, Laos, and Myanmar 
are the main exporters of energy (ADB 2010: 24–31). The main 
source of exported energy is hydropower, justified by its cost effec-
tiveness and its CO2-reduction capacity when compared to thermal 
energy (ADB 2010: 25).  
The GMS Roadmap for Expanded Energy Cooperation, adopted 
at the GMS Ministerial Conference in 2009 and based on an ADB 
Energy Strategy Study, emphasises four goal-areas: to provide access 
to modern energy; to lower carbon output and bolster renewable 
resources; to improve regional energy cooperation; and to encourage 
private sector participation. With hydropower being a central feature 
of the energy strategy, it is framed by a discourse of low-carbon eco-
nomic development through the harnessing of the renewable poten-
tial of water resources.  
Johnston argued that underpinning hydropower development in 
the GMS is a “culture of governance and modernisation mindset, one 
that typically views the installation of dams and diversion systems as a 
societal good” (Johnston 2012: 303). The aim of this modernisation 
project, to borrow Scott’s phrasing, is to drag a “technically back-
ward, unschooled, subsistence-oriented population into the twentieth 
century” (Scott 1999: 96). 
Place promotion in the GMS is thus firmly focused on driving a 
modernising agenda at basin scale. Matthews argues that the regional 
place name of “GMS,” coined by the ADB and used in all ADB docu-
ments  
suggests a homogenous, fixed space, erasing from the public mind 
a sense of the unique ecosystems and diverse cultures and liveli-
hoods that exist within the Mekong River Basin. As a name, 
“GMS” reflects and facilitates a focus on the development agen-
das and empowers actors working on behalf of those agendas who 
are increasingly distant from state citizens and local environmental 
concerns. (Matthews 2012: 355) 
The fast construction of large hydropower stations in the Mekong 
Basin has turned out to be a divisive development policy (Molle, 
Foran, and Floch 2009). Rising social protests in Burma, Thailand, 
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Laos, and Cambodia against large hydropower schemes mark this 
industry as a prime point of contention (see, e.g., on Burma, Simpson 
2013; on Thailand, Mirumachi 2012; on Vietnam, Evers and Bene-
dikter 2009; on Cambodia, Hensengerth 2015; on Laos, Baird and 
Shoemaker 2008). Several authors have pointed out how develop-
ment in the Mekong region benefits investors and government elites 
through resource capture but turns workers and local communities 
into losers of development, including those affected by hydropower 
projects (Oehlers 2006; Glassman 2010; Sims 2015).  
Specifically for hydropower, the attempt by governments to 
achieve energy security by constructing large hydropower dams ex-
acerbates already existing social tensions and produces various forms 
of human insecurity (Simpson 2007; Kuenzer et al. 2013). This sug-
gests that while cross-border infrastructure may produce integrated 
economies, socially the GMS is becoming increasingly fragmented 
and conflict-prone. Standoffs between police and villagers over the 
now suspended Cheay Areng project in Cambodia (Phak and Pye 
2014; Pye 2014), and the conflicts over the Myitsone and Mong Ton 
dams in Myanmar (Kirchherr, Charles, and Walton 2016), illustrate a 
situation in which communities have been willing to face authoritar-
ian responses to their grievances. In the following, the article will 
examine these processes with reference to the Lower Sesan 2 Dam.  
The Lower Sesan 2 Dam and Local Identities 
In contrast to how Cambodia is viewed in the ADB documents, the 
Cambodian government does not see Cambodia as only an exporter 
of electricity: a substantial portion of the energy produced from hydro-
power plants will fuel domestic development. To achieve this goal, 
the Cambodian government has sought to attract foreign investment 
while guaranteeing payments for electricity to the plant owner, there-
by shouldering considerable financial risk (Middleton, Matthews, and 
Mirumachi 2015: 143–145). The government aims to achieve upper-
middle-income country status by 2030, but the challenges are consid-
erable and include high electricity costs, high dependence on electri-
city and fuel imports, a lack of grid electricity in rural areas, and fre-
quent outages (Ham et al. 2013: 11–14). Expansion of grid electricity 
is therefore central to economic development plans. The two key 
sources to be developed are coal and hydropower. Indeed, a focus on 
  96 Oliver Hensengerth 

investment into these two energy sources underpins the govern-
ment’s understanding of sustainable development (Royal Govern-
ment of Cambodia 2010; Ministry of Environment, Ministry of For-
eign Affairs, and Ministry of Planning 2012).  
In Cambodia, all large dams are build–operate–transfer (BOT) 
projects, meaning that the project company builds the dam and oper-
ates it for a specified period, after which the project is transferred to 
the government unless the concession period is extended. BOT pro-
jects are common in contexts where domestic expertise in building 
and operating dams is lacking. Furthermore, in Cambodia, the project 
owner is also responsible for commissioning the EIA and for plan-
ning and implementing resettlement (Anonymous 1 2010). 
Lower Sesan 2, with a capacity of 400 megawatts (MW), was ap-
proved by the Council of Ministers in November 2012 (Royal Gov-
ernment of Cambodia 2013). This approval followed the completion 
both of the EIA by Key Consultants Cambodia in October 2008 and 
of the feasibility study by Power Engineering Consulting Joint Stock 
Company No. 1 (PECC1). Clearing of the reservoir area began in 
March 2013. The resettlement and compensation plan was published 
in January 2014. Construction began in February 2014. Some of the 
energy produced will go to Stung Treng, Kampong Cham, and 
Kratie, with the rest benefitting Phnom Penh (Anonymous 2 2017). 
As of June 2017 only 15 people remained in the reservoir area, 
maintaining the resistance that had been widespread in the earlier 
days of planning and construction. The construction company in-
formed the villagers that construction would be complete in Septem-
ber 2017, at which time the dam gate would be closed, inundating the 
area (Anonymous 2 2017).  
Lower Sesan 2 was originally a joint venture between Electricity of 
Vietnam’s (EVN) subsidiary EVN International Joint Stock Company 
and Cambodia’s Royal Group, who together incorporated the Cam-
bodia–Vietnam Hydropower Company as the project owner. EVN 
then withdrew as a major partner, and in November 2012 Hydro-
lancang International Energy, a subsidiary of China Huaneng, signed 
a memorandum of understanding with the Royal Group for an “ini-
tial two-year cash injection” into the project (Khouth, Sokha, and Pye 
2013). Since then, the project developer has been Hydropower Lower 
Sesan 2, a joint venture between Royal Group and Hydrolancang, 
which together own 90 per cent of the stakes. EVN International 
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Joint Stock Company owns the remaining 10 per cent (Royal Gov-
ernment of Cambodia 2013). The dam is funded partially by the 
company’s capital (30 per cent), and the remaining 70 per cent is 
provided by “an undisclosed bank loan” (International Rivers no date 
b). As the project moved from EVN to Hydropower Lower Sesan 2, 
so, too, did responsibility for environmental mitigation and resettle-
ment.  
Lower Sesan 2 has a 45-year concession period that includes five 
years of construction. During this time, Hydropower Lower Sesan 2 
is obliged to conduct training and human resources development so 
that by the end of the concession period, domestic expertise in run-
ning and maintaining dams can replace foreign expertise. Moreover, 
the company is required to conduct environmental mitigation and 
resettlement projects. 
Lower Sesan 2 is located near the confluence of the Sesan and 
Srepok rivers, which together with the Sekong River form the 3S 
river system, a part of the Mekong river system. The 3S system con-
tributes 23 per cent of total Mekong discharge. Blocking the rivers 
will therefore have significant impact on the Tonle Sap and the Me-
kong Delta (Adamson et al. 2009; Wild et al. 2015). Although it rep-
resents only 10 per cent of the entire Mekong watershed area, the 3S 
system contains 42 per cent of all Mekong fish species. In the Sesan 
River, fishermen catch 41 migratory fish species, which represent 60 
per cent of the total catch. Thirty to fifty thousand people are esti-
mated to depend on riverine resources along the Sesan River in Cam-
bodia (Baran et al. 2011: 3–4, 17–35). Despite this importance for 
food security, at least 42 dams are in various stages of development in 
the 3S system “without much regional coordination or stakeholder 
consultation” (Arias et al. 2014: 5304). 
As a consequence, the construction of hydropower dams in the 
3S system presents complex trade-offs between food security, fish 
biodiversity, local livelihood protection, and hydropower generation. 
Lower Sesan 2 alone is expected to cause a 9.3 per cent drop in fish 
biomass across the entire Mekong Basin (Ziv et al. 2012; Räsänen et 
al. 2015). According to the EIA, the dam will lead to the resettlement 
of 4,785 villagers (located in 1,059 households from seven villages in 
four communes) into six resettlement sites (Mekong Watch and 3S 
Rivers Protection Network 2013). The EIA further acknowledged 
that the impact on migratory fish would extend to the Mekong and 
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Tonle Sap and to Thailand, Laos, and Vietnam (Baird 2014). The 
environmental management plan provides compensation of USD 127 
million for lost assets including rice fields, trees, gardens, houses, and 
fisheries and stipulates the provision of land for relocation 
(Grimsditch 2012: 30). 
Cultural and Spiritual Issues 
One of the key compensation issues is that the area upstream and 
downstream of Lower Sesan 2 is home to a number of ethnic minori-
ties. One of the villages that has to make way for the reservoir is Kbal 
Romeas in Sesan District along the Srepok River, home to the Pu 
Nong community. According to the Cambodian Centre for Human 
Rights, known for its government-critical stance, the community of 
Kbal Romeas depends on fishing and non-timber forest products 
from the surrounding forests that provide food and items for trade. 
Proximity to the river is important, as a Srekor Commune resident 
argued:  
It is our traditional way of living to live near the river, and if we 
move to the mainland, we will have no job to do. (Cited in Khuon 
and Chen 2012; Cambodian Centre for Human Rights 2015: 1–2; 
Boonsrirat 2014) 
Furthermore, land and forests link the community to their ancestors 
and spirits, and these relationships  
form a key part of the community’s cultural identity and sense of 
wellbeing. The local forests contain important sites where local 
people pray to these spirits, invoking their help in maintaining the 
spiritual and physical health of the community. (Cambodian Cen-
tre for Human Rights 2015: 1–2; Moul and Seng 2012: 5)  
In interviews with communities in the Lower Sesan 2 area, Ham, 
Hay, and Sok report that  
88 per cent of the upstream villagers [… interviewed] mentioned 
that their religion and tradition would be affected if they were re-
located because their Buddhist temples, the guardian spirit of their 
village (neakta), the guardian spirit of the forest (areak), and their 
ancestors’ graveyards would be flooded. In addition, the guardian 
spirit of the rivers (neakta krahomkor) would be affected. All of 
these spirits […] are believed to protect villagers from illness, 
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bring them happiness and harmony, provide them with good 
businesses and agricultural activities, and protect them when they 
travel on the river. (Ham, Hay, and Sok 2015: 165) 
Economic, social, environmental, and spiritual aspects of life are thus 
strongly intertwined as a basis for well-being. As a consequence, pro-
tection of the forest and river ecology maintains what previous gener-
ations had already preserved, fulfilling spiritual beliefs that also estab-
lish customary law and guide social behaviour (e.g. White 1996: 335–
366 and 350–358 cited in Chhim 2005: 21; see also Palmieri 2010). 
For example, protection of ancestral burial grounds fulfils important 
functions of social customs and social cohesion. These burial grounds  
are extremely important spiritual sites. The families of the dead 
frequently pay their respects to the dead in order to attract good 
luck, make offerings of food and burn incense for them. They 
may invite Buddhist monks to perform ceremonies in the grave-
yards, especially on Phchum Ben Day (the day of the ancestors 
[…]) and Khmer New Year’s Day. It is believed that the ancestors 
will be angry and curse them with illness or other problems if they 
fail to conduct these rituals. […] if the area were to be flooded, 
there would be two ways of dealing with the ancestors’ graveyard: 
giving it up or moving it to the new location. Either way, spiritual 
and traditional rituals would have to be performed. This also ap-
plies to the movement of other spirits. Moreover, in seeking out a 
new place to live, local people must first ask the spirit of the land 
guardian (neakta) for permission by praying and through rituals. 
(Ham, Hay, and Sok 2015: 166) 
These cultural issues have not been included in compensation pol-
icies, which typically incorporate assets that can be expressed in eco-
nomic values. Yet, cultural and spiritual assets are often intangible 
and cannot be monetised (Ham et al. 2013: 54). Indeed, part of the 
dispute around compensation in Srekor Commune was the fact that 
compensation documents made no mention of ancestral burial 
grounds that are to be destroyed by the reservoir (Kuch 2014). Local 
resistance against the dam therefore had an important cultural com-
ponent.  
  
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Local Resistance to Lower Sesan 2 
In contrast to many other communities affected by hydropower 
plans, communities in the Lower Sesan 2 area are already well aware 
of the impacts that dams can have on livelihoods, as they suffered the 
negative effects of Vietnam’s Yali Falls Dam (Anonymous 1 2010; 
Baird 2016: 263). In 1996, EVN completed Yali Falls upstream on 
the Sesan River in Vietnam. Following completion of Yali Falls, vil-
lagers in Cambodia experienced floods. In total on the Cambodian 
side, Yali Falls has since affected 55,000 villagers from 16 ethnic 
communities in Ratanakiri and Stung Treng provinces by way of loss-
es in rice production, livestock, and fishing income, and damage to 
rice reserves, boats, fishing gear, and houses; in these cases, there was 
no compensation or any other form of mitigation. Yali Falls also 
signified the failure of EVN to fully comply with responsibilities set 
out in project documents for other dams in the 3S system (Seang et 
al. 2013: 7; Grimsditch 2012; International Rivers no date a; 3S Rivers 
Protection Network 2012; Mekong Watch and 3S River Protection 
Network 2013). Suspicion of EVN was therefore widespread.  
As part of the EIA process, Key Consultants held public consul-
tations in February 2008 with people who would be most affected by 
the project. Of those attending, 85 per cent disagreed with the pro-
ject. A second consultation was held in April 2008 by PECC1, result-
ing in 94 per cent agreement and raising questions as to the cause of 
this turnaround. A third meeting was organised by Key Consultants 
and PECC1 in the city of Stung Treng and attended by community 
representatives, NGOs, local government, private sector actors, and 
members of the Ministry of Environment and the Ministry of Indus-
try, Mines, and Energy (Grimsditch 2012: 33). In contrast to the wide 
agreement in the second meeting, Baird (2009) found that the vast 
majority of local people disagreed with the compensation and reloca-
tion provisions. Ham et al. (2013: 51) report that some community 
members did not “speak or understand Khmer well.” A lack of ap-
propriate interpretation services impeded effective engagement with 
local and national authorities and the dam developer (Ham, Hay, and 
Sok 2015: 163).  
Coalitions of regional and international NGOs and indigenous 
communities have protested against the dam, petitioned governments 
and dam builders, and refused to move to the designated resettlement 
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sites. Cited by International Rivers, Mrs. Von of Phe Village, Sesan 
Commune, Oyado District in Ratanakiri, said,  
We call to the governments of Cambodia and Vietnam to pay at-
tention for future studies and to cancel the Lower Sesan 2 Dam, 
because the project will mostly affect indigenous people and our 
livelihoods and rights and our fisheries […]. If the […] dam is 
built, the governments and companies must allow for more com-
munity participation throughout all steps of the process. (Sesan 
and Sekong Rivers Protection Network 2012)  
The acrimonious dispute also had wider political implications. While 
Srekor Commune had been under the control of the ruling Cambodi-
an People’s Party (CPP) until 2012, in the commune council elections 
of that year the oppositional Sam Rainsy Party emerged victorious, a 
reflection of the popular dissatisfaction with the way that CCP na-
tional and local party branches had pushed the dam project (Ham, 
Hay, and Sok 2015: 166–168).  
It is noteworthy that the compensation policy for Lower Sesan 2 
went through a number of reincarnations. The original policy was 
announced by EVN in 2011 (Ham, Hay, and Sok 2015: 162). A re-
vised and much improved policy was published by the Cambodian 
government in 2013. This committed Hydropower Lower Sesan 2 to 
provide compensation for farmland, houses, other structures and 
crops; to construct 797 houses of specified square metres; to provide 
five hectares of farmland per household; to construct public works 
per commune including roads, one commune office, one police sta-
tion, one pagoda, one health centre, one kindergarten, one primary 
school, one lower secondary school, one well for every five house-
holds, public gardens, a sports complex, and irrigation facilities; to 
provide an allowance and rice provisions for 12 months; and to offer 
basic vocational training to enable adaptation to the new livelihoods. 
It also set out specific sums for each activity, amounting to a total of 
nearly USD 39 million of a total budget of more than USD 781 mil-
lion (Royal Government of Cambodia 2013). Communities were also 
involved in resettlement-site selection, but the policy still lacked con-
sideration of the cultural impacts (Ham, Hay, and Sok 2015: 163, 
165). 
With this policy, government officials argued that they were at-
tempting to provide a model of good practice for compensation and 
resettlement in other dam projects (Ham, Hay, and Sok 2015: 163; 
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Anonymous 3 2015). However, in the face of continuing local oppo-
sition, the government decided to establish the Committee for Solv-
ing the Impacts of the Lower Sesan 2 Dam. As part of the resolution 
process, reports emerged that the dam had been substantially rede-
signed, including a reduction in height, installation of radial gates to 
improve sediment passage, and a change of project type to run-of-
river (International Rivers 2014a, 2014b: note 1).  
The Cambodia Daily reported that in February 2014 a group of 
eight villagers facing resettlement from Stung Treng and Ratanakiri 
provinces petitioned the ministries of industry, mines, and energy, of 
environment, and of finance, as well as the Chinese ambassador, that 
Hydropower Lower Sesan 2 enter into negotiations with them, argu-
ing that they had not been consulted. Among them was Puth 
Khoeun, a representative of Srekor Commune in Sesan District. The 
villagers were primarily concerned that the allocated land would be 
infertile, and that ancestral burial grounds would be destroyed with-
out compensation. According to Puth Khoeun, local villagers in his 
community were “particularly upset” about the destruction of the 
burial grounds (Kuch 2014). In response, Tuon Taing, Phluk Com-
mune chief, said that 16 families had already accepted offers between 
USD 8,000 and USD 20,000 to compensate for houses and land:  
Affected families have been offered compensation, I think that’s 
enough for them […]. The dam’s a good thing that will help de-
velop the community and create more jobs. (Cited in Kuch 2014) 
The statement of the commune chief points to disagreements be-
tween affected villagers. Indeed, Baird (2016: 257–258, 267) reports 
that while fundamental opposition to the dam is widespread in the 
reservoir and downstream areas, a small number of villagers in the 
reservoir area had accepted resettlement offers – although Baird 
(2016) also reports that some of this might have been due to intimi-
dation of villagers as well as attempts by Phnom Penh-based NGOs 
to negotiate better resettlement deals while dissuading villagers from 
openly opposing the project.  
Resettlement has been a complex issue. The director of a Cam-
bodian NGO that had dealt with villagers’ concerns for several years 
argued, similarly to Baird, that opposition had been widespread in the 
reservoir and downstream areas. At the same time, Cambodian villag-
es often comprise poor, medium-income, and rich households, each 
of whom may take a different view of the compensation packages. 
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Some poor people in particular had accepted compensation offers 
believing promises of better lives, although amongst those still re-
maining in the reservoir area some are poor and refuse to leave. 
Those who had left, however, found upon relocating that houses 
were inadequate and that community forestry and the spirit forests 
had not been restored in the new villages. Even poor people who had 
moved still wanted to see the spirit forests restored (Anonymous 2 
2017).  
Similarly, the Cambodian Centre for Human Rights (2015: 2) re-
ported that the compensation and resettlement offer by Hydropower 
Lower Sesan 2 “led to a three-way split among the villagers in Kbal 
Romeas.” While one group had accepted the offer, a second group 
argued they would accept the offer only pending a new EIA and after 
they had received the promised compensation; a third group rejected 
the offer entirely. However, in July 2015 people from other villages 
who had already accepted relocation, but had not yet moved, changed 
their minds. In a letter to Hydropower Lower Sesan 2, they requested 
that they be given enough time to store enough food in advance of 
moving to the new villages, pointing to problems with the fertility of 
the new land. Houses were poorly built and inadequate to keep cattle, 
villagers were asked to move in the middle of the farming season, and 
the question of the relocation of the spirit forests where the ancestral 
burial grounds are located was still unresolved (May 2015).  
In response, representatives from Hydropower Lower Sesan 2, 
Ith Prang of the Ministry of Mines and Energy, and deputy governor 
of Stung Treng Doung Pov pledged to properly relocate the graves, 
to provide 20 kilograms of rice per person per year (although it was 
not reported for how many years), to take on responsibility for the 
maintenance of the houses for four years (a pledge made by Hydro-
power Lower Sesan 2), and to not use force. Indeed, acknowledging 
the continued resistance of locals, Doung Pov said, “They are willing 
to die, but we are not going to let them die […] No one will force or 
drag them from their home” (cited in May 2015).  
However, villagers reported intimidation and threats (Baird 
2016). In addition, more subtle pressure was exerted. To coerce vil-
lagers into moving, the company and government created facts that 
led to deteriorating conditions in the old villages: schools were closed 
and teachers moved to the resettlement sites without providing re-
placements; health centres were established at resettlement sites only; 
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and village and commune chiefs were no longer present at the old 
sites. The company therefore decided to coerce villagers to move “by 
cutting off social connections” (Anonymous 2 2017). In their analysis 
of benefit-sharing mechanisms of Lower Sesan 2, Men et al. (2015) 
show that forms of benefit sharing are very basic and (where existent 
on paper) badly implemented, and that ultimately support for local 
livelihoods is overridden by national development objectives.  
Yet, not only are spiritual issues an important part of local liveli-
hoods and a chief problem in the conflict over the dam. They also 
form part of the inventory of local resistance (Baird 2016: 269). In 
March 2015, villagers from Lao and Pu Nong minorities paid tribute 
to the local deity Neakta Krahom Kor, guardian spirit of the river, in 
Srekor Commune, asking it to protect them from harm and “curse 
the officials and investors behind the dam” (Aun 2015). Following 
the ceremony, the villagers set up effigies – representing Minister of 
Mines and Energy Suy Sem, company owner Chip Mong, as well as 
officials from Hydrolancang and local authorities – and stabbed them 
with needles and burnt them, thus ritually killing their live targets. 
This provoked a reaction from Doung Pov, who argued that the 
ceremony had violated the rights of the investor (Aun 2015).   
Discussion: Lower Sesan 2 and Competing 
Identities in the GMS 
Indigenous communities in the global South often perceive hydro-
power projects as outside interventions by a modernising state into 
specific cultural, economic, social, and ecological settings. This inter-
vention occurs in the belief that an end to geographic isolation will 
enable communities to prosper. Yet the result is a realignment of 
existing user networks in new hierarchies that are dominated by a 
modernising state in alliance with transnational financiers and dam 
developers. This process of modernisation often ignores the rights of 
indigenous communities, including their traditional economic, social, 
and spiritual attachments to the river (Rigg 2006; Swyngedouw 2014; 
Duarte-Abadía, Boelens, and Roa-Avendaño 2015).  
The Lower Sesan 2 Dam is part of an ADB-supported regional 
modernisation programme to support GMS-wide power trade ar-
rangements, enthusiastically supported by all six GMS member states. 
The project’s goals are to reduce frequent outages and to accommo-
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date rising energy demands. In this project the ADB presents the 
GMS as a natural region, despite the fact that the institutions estab-
lishing the GMS reach back no further than 1992. This place promo-
tion occurs at the basin level, using the place name of the GMS as a 
powerful symbol for regional identification, legitimising external in-
tervention by the ADB, national governments, and transnationally 
operating companies into seemingly undeveloped places with idle 
resources, often inhabited by indigenous communities. Similarly, the 
Thai–Chinese-initiated Lancang–Mekong Cooperation invokes the 
entire stretch of the river to promote a programme of infrastructure 
building.  
In the case of the Lower Sesan 2 Dam, these external interven-
tions come in complex forms, including the ADB, the Cambodian 
government, Chinese financiers, and Hydrolancang, and – as in the 
case of the Srekor Commune police chief – may also include people 
in direct proximity to affected communities. The steadfast communi-
ty resistance to the project indicates that the attempt to portray the 
GMS as a natural region is not shared by everyone. Indeed, the issue 
of resettling the ancestral burial grounds sits in sharp contrast to the 
modernising vision underpinning the GMS. At the same time, by 
arguing for more participation, villagers express a willingness to en-
gage with external actors, attempting to negotiate a compromise to 
alleviate local impacts.  
While a large majority of local people rejected the dam entirely, 
resistance may not always signify total opposition. Instead, it may 
show an attempt to urge governments and developers to consider the 
impact in ways that safeguard economic, social, and spiritual aspects 
of community life. However, Cooke et al. (2017) argued that even 
where safeguards for indigenous people exist, they are seldom im-
plemented. Instead, people’s land is commodified and their cultural 
survival threatened.  
In Lower Sesan 2, some of the poor may have been more willing 
to accept compensation packages following the promise of better 
lives. However, there is no clear-cut socio-economic division, as 
many poor have resisted resettlement on account of the ancestral 
burial sites and spirit forests. And even where poor community 
members have accepted compensation, these spiritual aspects remain 
a key point of contention.  
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As a consequence, resistance to hydropower dams may have 
complex origins and often involves a debate over forms of moderni-
sation and development. Planning for energy production requires 
taking into account social, economic, and cultural rights by recognis-
ing and maintaining the links of communities to water bodies.  
The contending processes of what sort of development model 
the GMS should create brings us back to Zimmerbauer’s (2011) ex-
ploration of how leading actors conduct place promotion of new 
regions without reference to the multiple identities that can be found 
in an area as vast as the GMS. It can therefore be argued that the 
conflict over the Lower Sesan 2 Dam, and by extension over GMS 
development, “marks less a space-and-place opposition than one that 
allows for some form of relation beyond that woven by capital” (Herr 
1996: 18 cited in Limón 2008: 167).  
The literature on culture and water by Strang (2004) and others 
has evidenced how rivers can be essential to the perpetuation of cul-
tural lifeways. In this problem complex, as Boelens (2015) argued, the 
issue inherent in the development of water resources is not just who 
makes decisions or who has access to water; the issue is recognition 
of cultural rights and the preservation of these rights as the pressure 
on water resources increases. That the GMS is an economic devel-
opment programme based around the exploitation of the Mekong 
River is, therefore, especially problematic, as the river is used by dif-
ferent groups as a potent symbol for the creation of regional con-
sciousness and for cultural traditions and the survival of cultural iden-
tity and diversity.  
It is precisely the meaning of the Mekong river system that is 
contested. Identity in the Lower Sesan 2 conflict includes spiritual 
attachment to the river and the dependence this produces on the 
resource as a source of well-being. In the contest, villagers not only 
raised the issue of how to account for the loss of the ancestral burial 
grounds, they also resorted to traditional forms of justice, calling 
directly on the river’s guardian spirit to protect them. The state re-
sponse, that such action is illegal, marks the belief of the modernising 
state that local forms of authority and justice have no place in state-
led modernisation narratives. As Matthews argued, the dominant 
narrative of water resources development in the GMS “silences and 
devalues other cultural meanings [of water], such as local knowledge 
and local livelihoods” (Matthews 2012: 356). 
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As a consequence, the constructivist notion that there are no 
natural regions (Katzenstein 1997; Hettne and Söderbaum 2000; Jes-
sop 2003) directly contradicts the ADB’s attempts to portray the 
GMS as one such region. Söderbaum’s notion that regions are “dy-
namic settings for social interaction” (Söderbaum 2012: 18), and 
Hettne’s notion that regions “are created and recreated in the process 
of global transformation” (Hettne 1999a) present region-forming 
processes as socially, economically, and politically contested processes 
throughout which different identities, ideas, norms, and policies 
compete. Indeed, the projection of a unified notion of what the GMS 
represents might be unachievable if the Lower Sesan 2 Dam is a rep-
resentative example of hydropower projects. Such fragmentary pro-
cesses challenge the legitimacy of the GMS, as they reflect an unwill-
ingness of the project’s leading proponents to negotiate compromises 
between contending visions of development. Lacking value conver-
gence across its inhabitants, the GMS loses normative coherence and 
fragments into contrasting identities and senses of belonging as the 
state, assisted by the ADB, imposes itself on local identities.   
In this sense, the call by Katzenstein (1997) and others to view 
regions as socially constructed means that we can imagine different 
ideas of regional identity based on different spatial uses of river water. 
A region is thus a social construct that is organised spatially, around 
people’s lives and attachment to places. The view of the GMS as a 
natural region located at basin scale is difficult to defend when taking 
into account local water users, and in particular indigenous water 
users. While at GMS scale water is used as a source for the GMS 
power grid to enable economic interdependence, these goals are far 
from the concerns of many local communities affected by hydro-
power. Geographies of water use therefore exist on very different 
scales, creating competing waterscapes that embody different inter-
ests and identities.  
It is thus difficult to perceive of the GMS – to borrow from Jes-
sop (2003) – as an emergent and socially constructed phenomenon 
that is shared across the region’s diverse population. Instead, it ap-
pears as an elite project that has failed to produce value convergence 
and is witnessing a conflict between different identities in a key area 
of its future development. By virtue of their active engagement in the 
build-up of hydropower across Mekong countries, Chinese compan-
ies are a key participant in this conflict. A lack of engagement with 
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local communities, in particular indigenous communities facing spe-
cific cultural and livelihood issues, is likely to further exacerbate such 
conflicts.   
Conclusion 
Rising discontent amongst local communities against hydropower 
dams defies the attempt by governments and the ADB to portray the 
GMS as a natural region. Community protests against hydropower 
dams occur across the GMS and – importantly – also in authoritarian 
and semi-authoritarian settings. This shows willingness by popula-
tions to resist despite potentially violent government responses. It 
also indicates that crucial livelihood and identity issues are at stake.  
Notably, these protests do not always entail a complete opposi-
tion to hydropower dams; indeed, the potential benefits they may 
bring to the community if properly implemented are also taken into 
consideration. In some cases, resistance may represent a request to be 
given a voice and to have community identity and cultural rights pro-
tected by external recognition of, and concern for, the links between 
cultural survival and water. In current practice, hydropower plants 
and the uneven ways that benefits are distributed reflect competing 
waterscapes and networks of interest. A consideration of geographies 
of resource use therefore leads to a view of the GMS not as a cohe-
sive region but as one characterised by a mismatch between sources 
of electricity and the actors and locations that it benefits. This signi-
fies a lack of Hettne’s “regionness,” suggesting a lack of a shared 
sense of belonging and identification with the project of the GMS 
and the image that it projects.  
The case of the Lower Sesan 2 Dam and the wider hydropower 
developments in the GMS have implications for other regions where 
similar hydropower build-ups are occurring, often with the help of 
Chinese investment. Conflicts of a similar kind are occurring in, for 
instance, South America, including in Chile and Brazil – the latter has 
seen highly publicised conflicts over the Belo Monte Dam. Another 
region facing similar conflicts is Central America, where Guatemala 
and Panama, for instance, have often been sites of violent conflict 
between indigenous communities and modernising states. 
At stake are, therefore, the cultural rights of indigenous commu-
nities, set against the modernisation of a majoritarian society. The 
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development conflicts in the GMS are not unique to the Mekong 
Basin. As large hydropower dams are likely to remain the energy 
source of choice for many governments in the global South – and as 
climate change provides a rationale for investment in this type of 
energy – conflicts over the nature of modernisation and develop-
ment, along with questions of cultural rights, are likely to remain on 
top of the international development agenda for the foreseeable fu-
ture.  
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